New death penalty rule falls short
|
BROCK |
By JOHN A. BROCK
The Judicial Council recently addressed the subject of necessary qualifications
for lawyers assigned to represent defendants in capital cases. There is wide
agreement among informed people that quality of performance of defense counsel
is a very significant factor in predicting results in capital litigation. It
is commendable that the Judicial Council has acted in this area. In my view,
Rule 4.117, which took effect Jan. 1, should be seen as an initial step in the
right direction.
Rule 4.117 defines "minimum qualifications" for lawyers "appointed
to represent" capital case defendants. Included, for example, are requirements
that lead counsel have 10 years of criminal litigation experience, have tried
specified numbers of cases and meet specific MCLE training requirements.
A good argument can be made that the qualifications set out are minimal and
will do little to improve the practice in this area. On the other hand, a good
argument can probably be made that whatever rules are devised, some very inadequate
lawyers will still qualify because factors that easily lend themselves to measurement,
such as a number of cases tried, simply fail to address the quality or skill
of the lawyer's effort.
We all have seen the articles about individual lawyers who have multiple former
clients on death row. No one suggests those lawyers lack trial experience. Other
sections of the rule do try to assess areas that are more subjective and therefore
more difficult to measure, but they seem so general as to be of little use.
And, of course, paragraph (f) of the rule sets out "alternate qualifications"
so that a lawyer who failed to possess the "minimum qualifications"
may still be appointed. A cynic might argue that paragraph (f) has the potential
to undermine the entire rule.
The existence of rule 4.117 is an acknowledgment that capital cases are different
from ordinary criminal cases and from other kinds of trials. In capital cases,
lawyers are required to contend with issues and perform tasks they are not familiar
with from their work in other cases. The factual analysis involved in determining
whether guilt has been proven is different from the moral and normative considerations
involved in deciding whether a defendant's life should be taken.
Investigating and developing mitigation by means of a thorough social history
in an effort to present the client as a human being in the context of his developmental
background is a daunting task foreign to ordinary criminal practice. The necessity
of establishing an effective working relationship with the client in capital
cases is far more critical than in other cases, yet is sometimes far more difficult
to accomplish because these individuals have been badly damaged by the events
in their lives. Experience with ordinary trials is certainly important preparation,
but simply trying a fixed number of cases and meeting other modest demands of
the rule cannot guarantee that a lawyer will be prepared for what is involved
in trying the penalty phase of a capital case.
It is not my purpose to criticize the considerable work done in drafting the
current rule. I am writing to urge that it be considered a beginning and to
express hope that a published report was correct in saying that the Judicial
Council is exploring a suggestion that a screening panel or panels of judges
and lawyers experienced with these cases be assigned the role of determining
which lawyers are qualified to represent capital defendants. I recognize that
creating such a panel or panels will require considerable effort, so it is perhaps
worth considering the nature of the problem.
Most capital defendants cannot afford counsel and instead must rely on an appointed
lawyer to represent them. The state charges an individual defendant with a capital
crime. When that defendant cannot afford to hire counsel, the state selects
and appoints the lawyer for the defendant. When this lawyer performs incompetently
or inadequately and a death verdict is returned, should we not feel uncomfortable
about our system in which the defendant has had so little say about who was
charged with looking out for his interests? Is it not troubling that the state
both accused this defendant and provided him with a lawyer who proved inadequate?
It is simply an unavoidable fact that in some of these cases death verdicts
are returned where better lawyering could have prevented that outcome and where
the wrong done will not be righted on appeal or writ. In some of those cases,
juries could have been persuaded to a different verdict by a more talented lawyer
or one more committed to the defendant's interests.
In some of those cases, a life-saving disposition could have been achieved
without trial had the lawyer recognized the wisdom of that course and/or had
a more effective relationship with the client enabling him to convince the client
to agree to that course.
As long as we pursue capital punishment, we need to recognize that the power
of the state will often be directed at individuals who have little ability to
protect themselves. Se-lecting that man or woman's defender matters a great
deal to that defendant as well as to us as a society that believes in individual
justice.
Rule 4.117 is a good start and we should continue to move ahead in this area.
The qualifications set out in the rule should be specifically understood to
be evolving. We should continue to refine and define qualifications. The goal
should always be to consistently achieve high quality representation. And, as
mentioned above, I suggest a panel or panels of experienced judges would do
a better job of evaluating the qualifications of lawyers for appointment on
these cases.
Under the present rule, it appears that the trial court appoints counsel and
somehow must first itself make an assessment of whether counsel qualifies under
the rule. Presumab-ly, some process or protocol will be devised to assist the
courts in this task. Still, will application of this rule produce consistent
results in the courts of numerous different judges whose experience in these
matters will vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction?
A panel approach seems better suited than individual trial judges for making
these determinations. The advantages are several. A panel or panels of experienced
judges and lawyers regularly reviewing qualifications would quickly acquire
experience and some expertise in making these determinations. The panel would
develop a sense of the quality of the lawyers in the available pool and of the
variety of the talents and skills among those lawyers. As they review and compare
applications, they would likely find additional or better ways to define or
measure the qualities relevant to effectively trying these cases.
In other words, they would accumulate knowledge from their work which the Judicial
Council could readily access and utilize should it seek to improve upon what
it has set out in rule 4.117. Members of a permanent or ongoing panel would
have the time, motivation and flexibility when appropriate to seek out additional
information about lawyers seeking to be found qualified. The applicant could
be contacted with particular questions or other lawyers from his or her community
could be contacted as references. As practicing lawyers, we tend to know who
in our community is competent and to what degree.
I recognize that these few suggestions will involve considerable ongoing effort.
It is also clear that the best we can hope to achieve is im-provement, not perfection.
Given what is at stake, the argument for making this effort is compelling.
John A. Brock supervises capital cases in the Los Angeles Public Defender's
office.
|