Until just over a decade ago, the road of
criminal discovery in Calif-ornia ran only one way: The prosecution
was statutorily and constitutionally obligated to furnish evidence to
the defense, and the defense had no duty to reciprocate. (See In re
Misener, 38 Cal.3d 543 (1985).) As approved by California's voters
on June 5, 1990, Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform
Act," changed all that by requiring that the prosecution and defense
disclose to one another the evidence that they are going to present at
trial. The Supreme Court explained in upholding the constitutionality
of the act that "Proposition 115 effectively reopened the two-way
street of reciprocal discovery in criminal cases in California." (Izazaga
v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 356, 363 (1991).)
There are many potholes for lawyers on this
highway, and some can be severely jarring. Violations of the discovery
rules are punishable by sanctions ranging from preclusion of evidence
to contempt of court, and the State Bar of California may discipline
lawyers for violations.
Defense attorneys in criminal cases face
especially daunting obstacles. As exemplified by the charges once
leveled against the lawyers representing the defendant in the Sym-bionese
Liberation Army case, publicizing or disclosing to the public the
address or telephone numbers of witnesses turned over by the
prosecution is a misdemeanor which carries up to six months in jail.
(See Pen. Code §1054.2.)
Given the complexity and potentially dire
consequences of modern criminal discovery procedures, both prosecutors
and defense lawyers should familiarize themselves with the law in this
field. A good road map through this hazardous legal terrain is
essential for practitioners.
On the treacherous turnpike
The journey to two-way discovery started when
Proposition 115 was enacted, creating a scheme whereby both the
prosecution and defense must disclose to the other side before trial
the names, addresses and statements of witnesses which the party
"intends to call" at the trial. (Pen. Code, §§1054.1, 1054.3.)
The statute specifically exempted disclosure to the prosecution of the
defendant's own statements, so as to not violate a defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the
attorney-client privilege. (Pen. Code, §1054.3, subd. (a).)
The California Supreme Court in Izazaga v.
Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.3d 356 held that the scheme did not
violate either the federal or state Constitutions. It also held that a
party "intends to call" a witness when "it reasonably
anticipates it is likely to call" the witness to testify at trial.
(Id., at p. 376, fn. 11.) This is an objective standard aimed at
avoiding shenanigans like an attorney falsely claiming that he or she
did not "really" think of calling the witness until the last
possible moment.
A lawyer's ethical duty to be truthful with the
court should prevent such misrepresentations. (See Rule 5-200 of the
California Rules of Profes-sional Conduct ["In presenting a matter
to a tribunal, a member . . . (B) Shall not seek to mislead the judge,
judicial officer, or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law"].) Nonetheless, use of an objective standard greatly simplifies
matters be-cause it is enough that a reasonable lawyer under the same
circumstances would have elected to call the witness.
Disclosure or consequences
Once a party has decided that it intends to call
a witness at trial, the duty of disclosure to the opposing side is
triggered. (Pen. Code, §§1054.1, 1054.3.) If a party breaches this
duty by making a late disclosure, the aggrieved party may ask the
judge to impose sanctions, including preclusion of the witness'
testimony from the trial, and the judge may initiate contempt of court
proceedings.
If a lawyer is found to have violated the
discovery rules, a judge can, and in some instances, must report the
matter to the State Bar for potential discipline. Business and
Profes-sions Code §6086.7 provides that "a court shall notify the
State Bar of any of the following: (a) A final order of contempt
imposed against an attorney that may involve grounds warranting
discipline under this chapter." If the judge believes that the
discovery violation is severe enough to warrant discipline, the judge
must report it to the State Bar.
Penal Code §1054.5, subdivision (b), states that
upon a failure to comply with the duty to disclose, "a court may
make any order necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter,
including, but not limited to, immediate disclosure, contempt
proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the
presentation of real evidence, continuance of the matter, or any other
lawful order. Further, the court may advise the jury of any failure or
refusal to disclose and of any untimely disclosure." The law also
states that "the court may prohibit the testimony of a witness
pursuant to subdivision (b) only if all other sanctions have been
exhausted." (Pen. Code, §1054.5, subd. (c).)
A contempt citation carries dire consequences for
the offending lawyer. The judge can impose a fine of up to $1,000 and
add a jail sentence of up to five days. (Code of Civ. Proc. §1218,
subd. (a).) The State Bar can discipline the lawyer by disbarment or a
suspension of the right to practice law. (Bus. & Prof. Code §6100.)
Barring witnesses from testifying
An unscrupulous attorney out to prevail at all
costs may well feel it is worth risking being held in contempt in
order to win a case. However, the sanction of barring the lawyer's
witnesses from testifying should make him think twice.
Only a handful of published Calif-ornia cases
have addressed the propriety of a preclusion sanction for a discovery
violation. Even though all the cases have dealt with judges who barred
criminal defendants' witnesses from testifying, the California
Supreme Court has stated that the defense and prosecution standards
are identical in this regard. (People v. Tillis, 18 Cal.4th 284, 290,
fn. 3 (1998).)
Further, although the standards in these cases
have been derived from federal opinions that involved a defendant's
constitutional right to present evidence, under the Calif-ornia
Constitution prosecutors have the right to due process of law (Cal.
Const., art. I, §29), so the prosecution's constitutional rights
must also be respected when considering a preclusion sanction.
One of the cases held that "absent a showing of
significant prejudice and willful conduct, exclusion of evidence is
not appropriate as punishment" for a discovery violation. (People v.
Gonzales, 22 Cal.App.4th 1744, 1758 (1994).) The Court of Appeal
reasoned that "to conclude otherwise might well place upon the
truth-finding process an imprimatur of unreliability inconsistent with
confidence in a finding of guilt." (Ibid.)
People v. Edwards, 17 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1263
(1993) found that a preclusion sanction should be used "only for the
most egregious discovery abuse." Edwards held that to justify
preventing a party from calling a witness, the violation must be
deliberate and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage at
trial. In both of these cases, the appellate courts concluded that the
defense's actions did not merit a preclusion sanction.
In People v. Jackson, 15 Cal.App. 4th 1197
(1993), however, the Court of Appeal did find that preclusion was a
valid penalty. When the prosecution rested its drug possession case,
the defense disclosed that it wanted to use as evidence a written
statement that showed that the drugs were owned by another person.
(The document fell within Evid. Code §1230's declaration against
penal interest hearsay exception.)
Finding that due to the tardiness of the
disclosure the person who wrote the document could not be found, the
judge excluded the defense evidence.
Jackson affirmed, holding that the defense had
deliberately chosen to surprise the prosecution with the evidence
mid-trial, and that no other sanction would have been effective
because, since the person who made the written statement was
unavailable, the prosecution would have been unable to effectively
rebut the document.
The scant case law in this area is in agreement:
Preclusion sanctions may be imposed only for the most egregious
discovery violations. The mere existence of a preclusion sanction,
however, is a strong deterrence reinforcing attorneys' ethical duty
to be forthright with the court and opposing parties.
Criminal charges as a sanction?
A separate type of discovery violation can be
enforced not just by contempt and preclusion sanctions, but by
criminal penalties. Penal Code §1054.2, subdivision (a)(1) was added
by the legislature a few years after Proposition 115's discovery
provisions, and provides that "no attorney may disclose or permit to
be disclosed to a defendant, members of the defendant's family, or
anyone else, the address or telephone number of a victim or witness
whose name is disclosed to the attorney pursuant to subdivision (a) of
§1054.1." (Pen. Code §1054.1, subd. (a) is the statute that
requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense information
concerning witnesses it "intends to call" at trial.)
Section 1054.2, subdivision (a)(3) states that
"willful violation of this subdivision by the attorney, or persons
appointed by the court, is a misdemeanor." Punishment for the
misdemeanor can include a fine of $1,000 and up to six months in jail.
(Pen. Code §19.)
Several exceptions are set forth: It is
permissible to disclose the information if permitted by a court after
a hearing and a showing of good cause. (Section 1054.2, subd. (a)(1).)
It is also OK to disclose the information to persons employed by the
attorney, like investigators, when necessary for the preparation of
the case. (Sec-tion 1054.2, subd. (a)(2).)
Finally, if the defendant is representing
himself, disclosure of the name and address of the victim or witness
must be given only to the defendant's private investigator. (Section
1054.2, subd. (b).)
In the Symbionese Liberation Army fugitive case,
misdemeanor charges were filed against the defendant's two attorneys
for allegedly allowing a motion that contained prosecution
witnesses' addresses and telephone numbers to be placed on a public
website.
The website, which is pro-defense and based in
Minnesota, routinely places all defense motions online (as well as
hawking the defendant's cookbook, Serving Time, America's Most
Wanted Recipes).
The motion was filed by the defense attorneys in
court, and it appears that the website merely picked it up and put it
online just as it had done with all the other motions. (The charges
were later dismissed.)
The case raises interesting issues concerning the
mental state needed for the misdemeanor in §1054.2. For example, is
mere negligence sufficient to violate the law? Section 1054.2,
subdivision (a)(3) makes only a "willful violation" a crime,
meaning that the defendant must exhibit "a purpose or willingness to
commit the act." (Pen. Code §7, subd. (1).)
However, a "defendant may be found to have
acted with 'criminal negligence' without proof that he or she
intended to commit the act." (People v. Lara, 44 Cal.App.4th 102,
108 (1996).)
Assuming that more than mere negligence is
required to violate the statute, if an attorney accidentally allowed
disclosure of the prosecution's information, he or she would not be
guilty of the crime in §1054.2. Nonetheless, even if a lawyer is
acquitted or has the §1054.2 misdemeanor charges dismissed, the State
Bar will still be free to discipline the lawyer unfettered by the
disposition of the criminal case. (See Hawkins v. State Bar, 23 Cal.3d
622 (1979).)
The moral of the story
California's two-way discovery procedures for
criminal cases were enacted "[t]o promote the ascertainment of truth
in trials." (Pen. Code §1054, subd. (a).) The scheme recognizes
that tension often exists in trials between the drive to expose the
truth and the urge to win.
Proposition 115 procedures thus empower the
judge, as the traffic cop on the discovery highway, to enforce the
rules through citations ranging from contempt, monetary sanctions,
preclusion of evidence and reporting an offender to the State Bar.
Alex
Ricciardulli is a deputy public defender in Los Angeles County,
specializing in appellate practice, a regular legal columnist and
co-author of the "Three Strikes Manual" (Compendium Press, 1997). |